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Summary
When people who advocate integrating conventional science-based
medicine with complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) are
confronted with the lack of evidence to support CAM they counter by
calling for more research, diverting attention to the ‘package of care’ and
its non-specific effects, and recommending unblinded ‘pragmatic trials’.
We explain why these responses cannot close the evidence gap, and focus
on the risk of biased results from open (unblinded) pragmatic trials. These
are clinical trials which compare a treatment with ‘usual care’ or no
additional care. Their risk of bias has been overlooked because the
components of outcomemeasurements have not been taken into account.
The components of an outcome measure are the specific effect of the
intervention and non-specific effects such as true placebo effects,
cognitive measurement biases, and other effects (which tend to cancel out
when similar groups are compared). Negative true placebo effects
(‘frustrebo effects’) in the comparison group, and cognitive measurement
biases in the comparison group and the experimental group make the
non-specific effect look like a benefit for the intervention group. However,
the clinical importance of these effects is often dismissed or ignored
without justification. The bottom line is that, for results from open
pragmatic trials to be trusted, research is required to measure the clinical
importance of true placebo effects, cognitive bias effects, and specific
effects of treatments.
Introduction
Integrative medicine, the integration of comp-
lementary and alternative medicine (CAM) with
conventional healthcare, is being increasingly
adopted within mainstream health services. IM
advocates, faced with a growing body of evidence
that questions the effectiveness of CAM therapies
and their underlying theories, have responded
vigorously using strategies that call for more
research when there is evidence of no clinically
important benefit; focus on the ‘package of care’
rather than specific interventions; talk vaguely
about ‘non-specific effects’ rather than precisely
about placebo effects and bias effects; and call
for unblinded pragmatic trials of CAM without
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considering the risks of bias. We explain why each
of these strategies fails to close the gap between
the evidence and the claims of integrative medi-
cine – the integrative medicine evidence gap.
Our focus onproblemswith research inCAMand
integrativemedicine isaspecificresponse toattempts
intended to bring them into the mainstream. It does
not imply that the evidence base in conventional
medicine does not also have major problems.1,2
Why ‘more research is
needed’ does not close the
integrative medicine evidence gap
When research provides good evidence that CAM
treatments have no clinically important benefit,
advocates of CAM call for more research.3 Super-
ficially, this suggests a scientific and open mind.
However, a chasm exists between the even-
handed skepticism characteristic of science and
the partisan denial characteristic of CAM. The
integrative medicine community presumes that
CAM is effective because practitioners and
patients believe it to be.4 For example, rigorous
syntheses of a weighty body of evidence could
not unearth any benefit from homeopathy5 but
homeopaths denied the value of scientific evalu-
ation and concocted a theory, no more plausible
than that of homeopathy itself, to explain why
such evaluations fail.6 CAM advocates, denying
the evidence of lack of effectiveness, call for even
more research despite the expenditure of very
large sums on research that fails to provide what
they would regard as convenient evidence. For
example, in the USA, the $1.288 billion spent
since 1999 by the National Center for Complemen-
tary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) on
research into CAM, has produced no reliable evi-
dence of benefit from any CAM modality.7
Scientific skepticism assumes that treatments
are ineffective and unsafe until there is good evi-
dence to the contrary. Progress in scientific endea-
vours such as medicine and engineering, comes
from testing predictions derived from hypotheses,
and when predictions fail, the falsified hypotheses
are rejected and new hypotheses developed for
testing – a process termed the hypotheticodeduc-
tive model.8,9
Thus, when a body of good evidence indicates
that a therapy has no clinically useful specific
effects, scarce resources should not be wasted in
conducting more research.
Why focusing on the ‘package of
care’ does not close the integrative
medicine evidence gap
Advocates of integrative medicine say that it is
‘the effect of the package of care delivered by the
therapist or therapists that is of interest rather
than the individual components of the treatment
package’.10 So, for example, the needling in acu-
puncture, the spinal manipulation in chiropractic,
and the pillule in homeopathy are not of particular
interest because the relevant effects are due to the
whole package of care.10–13
Focusing on the ‘package of care’ is rhetorically
convenient for two reasons. First, it camouflages
the embarrassing (for integrative medicine) fact
that well-controlled and adequately blinded
studies of CAM interventions fail to find clinically
useful specific effects.14 Secondly, the package of
care may seem to have clinically important
effects,15 but, as we will explain when we
discuss non-specific effects, things are not always
what they seem.
Concentrating on the package of care, although
convenient, is misleading and unscientific: it
suggests that it does not matter if the intervention
has no useful specific effects and that we should
not bother to unpack the package to find out
which components dowhat. Because this approach
could be used to justify any bogus medicine, drugs
must have evidence of specific effects before they
are licensed.
While scientific medicine regards it as
essential to investigate specific effects, it has
long recognized the importance of the package
of care and its components have been the
subject of much research, including the roles of
expectation,16 and communication,17 and the
therapeutic relationship between doctor and
patient.4,18
Mistaking the package of care as unique to
CAM and concluding that the package should
not be unpacked deflects us from important
research endeavours and treatment opportunities.
We should identify and exploit those components
that are effective and discard those that are ineffec-
tive or even harmful.
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Why focusing on ‘non-specific
effects’ does not close the
integrative medicine evidence gap
Advocates of integrative medicine use the term
‘non-specific effect’ in preference to ‘placebo
effect’, perhaps because placebo effect has nega-
tive associations4 and is sometimes used with con-
tempt or disapproval as in ‘it’s only a placebo’, or
‘placebo treatments are unethical’.
The terms non-specific effects and placebo
effects are often assumed to be equivalent and
are often used without explanation. This hinders
clear thinking because neither term accurately
describes its meaning. Placebo effects are not
due to the placebo medicine (or sham treatment)
because, by definition, placebos have no specific
effects. And, non-specific effects can be quite
specific but arise from unspecified causes.
To understand the difference between true
placebo effects and non-specific effects we need
first to understand what a clinical trial measures.
In a clinical trial, an outcome measurement is the
net result of four types of effect: (1) the specific
effect of the intervention; (2) the non-specific
effects that are due to the context and process of
delivery of the intervention and how outcomes are
measured; (3) random variations in all components
of themeasurement; and (4) errors such as innocent
mistakes or deliberate fraud. Here we can ignore
random variation (this evens out in the long run)
and errors (they will be discovered eventually).
The true placebo effect is the clinical effect of
the package of care that is not due to the specific
intervention. The non-specific effect (or perceived
placebo effect19) is the observed effect of the
package of care in the placebo group of a clinical
trial; as illustrated in Table 1 it is the net result of
the true placebo effect plus systematic measure-
ment errors (biases).15
Some systematic measurement errors are the
same in the different arms of a clinical trial and
so cancel out when the different arms are com-
pared. These include the natural course of the
disease, instrument biases and regression to the
mean. Other systematic measurement errors are
likely to be different in the different arms of a clini-
cal trial and therefore introduce errors such as cog-
nitive measurement biases into comparisons
between different groups.
Cognitive measurement biases are errors of
attribution, recollection or reporting that lead to
systematic errors in outcome measurements.
They may originate in the patient, the therapist
or the assessor of outcome measures. Cognitive
biases can cause a trial participant to report what
they think the trial organizers want/ought to
hear, or cause a practitioner to recall mostly
favourable outcomes.
Placebo-controlled clinical trials can separate
out an intervention’s specific effect, because it is
the difference between the observed effects in
the intervention and placebo groups. However,
special studies are required to separate true
placebo effects from other non-specific effects.
Such studies are seldom performed, but this
does not mean that they are unimportant. True
placebo effects and cognitive measurement
biases must be distinguished for two reasons.
First, true placebo effects are welcome when they
are positive – research into enhancing and exploit-
ing them should thus be encouraged. Second, cog-
nitive measurement biases diminish the reliability
of clinical trials; more research is required to esti-
mate their importance and to provide guidance
on how to reduce the risk that the results are
biased.
Why ‘a different research approach
is needed’ does not close the
integrative medicine evidence gap
Integrative medicine proponents argue that
blinded, placebo-controlled, randomized trials
are unsuitable for studying CAM and that
unblinded pragmatic trials are therefore essen-
tial.3,10,20 This argument is based on a misunder-
standing of the distinction between ‘explanatory’
and ‘pragmatic’ attitudes in therapeutic trials
drawn by Schwartz and Lelouch in 1967.21
Explanatory trials and pragmatic trials differ in
their purpose and design22 and have valuable but
distinct roles. Explanatory clinical trials minimize
bias and variation and the intervention is often
compared with a placebo. Explanatory trials are
best suited to answer the question ‘Does the inter-
vention work in ideal circumstances and if so, by
how much?’ Pragmatic clinical trials are less pre-
scriptive in their design, often permit some
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degree of variation in the delivery of the exper-
imental treatment, and the comparison is often
with ‘usual care’. Ideally, pragmatic trials are con-
ducted after explanatory trials have provided sup-
porting evidence that the intervention can work in
ideal circumstances. Pragmatic trials answer the
question ‘How well does this intervention, work
in usual practice?’ Compared with explanatory
trials, pragmatic trials provide a package of treat-
ment closer to that given in routine practice. Some-
times that means that the therapist or the patient or
both cannot be blinded but it is not always so.
Blinding of assessors, randomization, and the
use of objective assessments of outcomes are all
possible, indeed desirable in pragmatic studies.23
Some CAM proponents have argued that using
a placebo predisposes to type II errors (falsely
concluding that there is no effect) because the non-
specific effects are experienced by both interven-
tion and placebo groups.10 Far from it. With the
non-specific effects controlled for in this way, the
specific effects of CAM can be truly explored.
Others mistakenly assume that pragmatic trials
are never blinded.12 Some even see the lack of
blinding as an advantage.13 This belief is ‘justified’
with fallacies such as ‘In a pragmatic trial, it is not
usually appropriate to use a placebo control and
blinding, as these are likely to have a detrimental
effect on the trial’s ecological validity’.12 Or, lack
of blinding should ‘maximize synergy’ and ‘opti-
mize non-specific effects’.12 Or, ‘clinician and
patient biases are not necessarily viewed as detri-
mental in a pragmatic trial but accepted as part of
physicians’ and patients’ responses to treatment
and included in the overall assessment.’24
Failure to recognize the distinction between
true placebo effects and observed non-specific
effects can lead to serious misinterpretations of
the trial results, as we explain in the next section.
Why unblinded pragmatic
clinical trials do not close the
integrative medicine evidence gap
In an unblinded pragmatic trial, the difference
between outcomes in the CAM and usual care
groups is commonly misunderstood to provide
evidence for beneficial effects of the treat-
ment.12,13,20 However, these interpretations over-
look the important risks of bias illustrated in
Table 1.
Table 1
Components of non-specific effects in the experimental and comparison groups of a clinical trial
Experimental group Comparison group Individual effects Net effect
Regression to the
mean
Temporal variation
Instrumental
measurement biases
Regression to the
mean
Temporal variation
Instrumental
measurement biases
These effects are similar
in the two groups, and
so they cancel each
other out
No difference between
the two groups
True placebo effect
Positive cognitive bias
in the observer
Positive cognitive bias
in the patient
Positive non-specific
effects in the
experimental group
produce a perceived
benefit for the
experimental group
Perceived net beneficial
effect of the intervention
Negative cognitive bias
in the patient
Negative cognitive bias
in the observer
Frustrebo effect
Negative non-specific
effects in the
comparison group
produce a perceived
benefit for the
experimental group
For brevity, some effects are not shown, for example, random variation (which evens out in the long run)
and errors such as innocent mistakes and deliberate fraud, which will be discovered when studies are
independently repeated
!
!
)
)
)
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The first risk of bias is that there is a negative
placebo response in the usual care group. This is
especially important when patients are recruited
with expectations about the value of a CAM and
are then disappointed not to receive it. Negative
placebo effects are also called nocebo (Latin ‘I
shall harm’) effects, but the term is better used
for unwanted adverse effects that arise from
taking a placebo.25 We suggest a better term for
the negative clinical response elicited by not
receiving one’s preferred treatment might be frus-
trebo (Latin ‘I shall disappoint’). A similar
concept, the non-specific effects in trial partici-
pants assigned to a less preferred treatment, is
‘resentful demoralization’.26 Resentful demorali-
zation effects include frustrebo effects and cogni-
tive measurement bias effects. Frustrebo effects
are biases because they make the difference
between the CAM group and usual care group
seem like a benefit for the CAM group.
Another source of bias is cognitive measure-
ment bias. This is a particular risk with subjective
patient-reported outcome measures of pain and
disability. The directions of these cognitive biases
would be expected to be the same as the directions
of placebo and frustrebo effects: positive in the
CAM group and negative in the usual care group.
What is the evidence on biases
from non-specific effects?
Disappointingly little research has been done to
measure the individual contributions of the frus-
trebo effect and cognitive measurement bias in
open clinical trials, and we were unable to locate
any directly relevant studies. Nevertheless, it is
inconceivable that this particular human activity
should be free of these biases given their ubiqui-
tous presence elsewhere.27
Indirect evidence on the combination of frus-
trebo and cognitive measurement bias effects
(‘resentful demoralization’) could be provided
by ‘patient preference trials’, or preferably a
meta-analysis of such trials. One meta-analysis
has been conducted.28 It is difficult to draw
general conclusions from the meta-analysis,
because the results are dominated by trials in
which participants had only mild preferences for
the treatments, and therefore probably small frus-
trebo and cognitive bias effects. Trials of CAM
interventions such as acupuncture generally find
that almost all people would prefer to be given
the test treatment,28,29 and thus frustrebo and cog-
nitive bias effects would be expected to be larger.
Evidence (albeit indirect) that the potential for
cognitive bias is greater when outcomes are self-
reported and subjective rather than objective is
provided by a large systematic review.30 The
study reviewed 146 meta-analyses of 1346 trials
and found that for studies with subjective out-
comes, lack of blinding was associated with exag-
gerated estimates of effect (ratio of odds ratios
0.75; 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.61–0.93). In
contrast, there was little evidence of bias in trials
with objective outcomes (ratio of odds ratios
1.01, 95% CI 0.92–1.10).30 It is not surprising there-
fore that hard outcomes, such as survival rates, are
rarely used in CAM trials.
Conclusions
We have explained the muddled thinking under-
lying several strategies aimed at closing the inte-
grative medicine evidence gap: to call for more
research when there is good evidence of no clini-
cally important benefit; to focus attention on the
‘package of care’ rather than the specific interven-
tion; to promote clinical trials that measure non-
specific effects rather than specific effects; and to
promote unblinded pragmatic trials without due
concern for the several risks of bias in their results.
We have shown that it is important to dis-
tinguish between true placebo effects and non-
specific effects. We have explained that non-specific
effects provide an illusion of true benefit because
they include not only true placebo effects (which
are to be welcomed), but also bias effects (which,
if they cannot be avoided, should at least be
taken into account). And, we have demonstrated
that results from unblinded pragmatic clinical
trials are plausibly at high risk of several sources
of bias.
This muddled thinking has affected funding
and clinical policy decisions. For example on the
basis of evidence on non-specific effects from
unblinded pragmatic trials the German Federal
Joint Committee of Physicians and Health Insur-
ance Plans made acupuncture for low back pain
and knee pain benefits of German health insur-
ance,31 and the National Institute for Health and
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Clinical Excellence recommended acupuncture,
spinal manipulation and exercise as treatment
options for persistent low back pain.13
Research programmes are also likely to be
adversely affected. For example, a report commis-
sioned by the prestigious King’s Fund has sup-
ported calls for more unblinded pragmatic trials
into CAM without cautioning that results from
such trials are at high risk of several biases.20
While more research is needed into the true
placebo effect, it is the area of cognitive measure-
ment bias in trials that appears most under-
researched. There is scope for routinely assessing
the risk of such biases, and frustrebo biases, in
pragmatic trials with patient preference allocation.
A re-think is also needed in how research is
reported. Guidance on research reporting, such
as the CONSORT statement32 and its extensions,
might need reviewing to highlight the limitations
of open trials with subjective outcome measures,
and to recommend reporting participants’ prefer-
ences and their association with outcomes.
At this time of a drive for efficiency savings in
the health services, it is especially important that
expenditure should be directed to effective inter-
ventions and not be wasted on ineffective ones.
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